Eficiência Administrativa e Desjudicialização na Previdência Social: Estudo Comparado entre Brasil e Estados Unidos

Arquivo indisponível

Aluno-pesquisador: 

Cláudio Bessa de Oliveira Jeronimo dos Santos

Orientador: 

  • Professor Luis Felipe Lopes Martins

Ano: 

2025

Escola: 

  • Direito Rio – Escola de Direito Rio de Janeiro

The paper examines administrative efficiency and judicialization in Brazil’s social security system through a comparative analysis with the United States. It highlights how Brazil’s National Social Security Institute (INSS) faces systemic challenges—such as high litigation rates, inconsistent administrative decisions, and insufficient procedural standardization—that undermine constitutional principles of efficiency, equality, and the separation of powers. Drawing on the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA), the study explores how administrative reforms, procedural safeguards, and structured judicial deference can reduce excessive litigation and enhance institutional legitimacy. Measures such as standardized protocols, specialized administrative judges, and “multi-door” (multiportas) conflict-resolution mechanisms are analyzed for their potential to increase speed, fairness, and reliability in benefit determinations. The paper also underscores the limits of transplanting foreign practices, noting Brazil’s stronger emphasis on solidarity, centralized norms, and uniformity.